

# When States Die: geographic and territorial pathways to state death

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*ABSTRACT* State death, understood as the formal loss of control over foreign policy, is an important but neglected issue in the international relations literature. When do states die and why? How do states exit the system? The consequences of state death can be wide-ranging, from forced migration movements, regional instability, to general famine. Despite these severe consequences, political scientists have yet to adequately study the causes of state death. Fazal finds that states are prone to death when they are located as a buffer between two rivals; this suggests that being a buffer state is a cause of state death. Our expansion of current research seeks to add the concept of territorial disputes to the state death literature. We suggest that states are at greater risk of death when they become involved in territorial disputes that raise the stakes of conflict. The resulting research demonstrates that a reliable predictor of state death is engagement in a territorial dispute. Territorial disputes are the most prevalent issue that leads to war and can also be a leading cause of state death.

State death is an important but neglected concept within the international relations literature.<sup>1</sup> Since the survival of the state is typically the minimum a leader must strive for to maintain political power,<sup>2</sup> the potential loss of functional statehood requires scholarly attention. When do states die and how do they ‘exit’ the system? The consequences of state death can, in principle, be wide-ranging and may include institutional disintegration, mass violence, forced migration movements, or the establishment of zones of impunity.<sup>3</sup> Despite the potential for these severe outcomes, researchers have so far neglected to empirically and systematically study the causes of state death in a satisfactory manner. This article seeks to push the study of state death forward and suggests there are other factors at work than extant research has identified.

Fazal demonstrates empirically that states typically become predatory targets when they fall between two rivals, and suggests that being a buffer state is a primary cause of state death.<sup>4</sup> State death is understood as the loss of formal control over political decision making within the state, particularly

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foreign policy decision making, to another state. States die when they come between the ambitions of two states with a history of rivalry. Rivals are defined as long-term historical enemies who have fought a series of militarised disputes and wars.<sup>5</sup> This view of state death is incomplete because it does not account for the factor of territorial disputes, which often precedes the development of buffer state status. Buffer states are not always disinterested victims caught between rival states and often have their own territorial issues with neighbours which, arguably, help lead to the development of buffer status. Our expansion and refinement of current research adds the concept of territoriality to the state death debate. Territoriality is understood as the inherent need to control and delineate territorial boundaries and is often associated with issues of national security, international prestige or domestic morale.<sup>6</sup> We theorise that states are more likely to die when they become involved in territorial disputes. Furthermore, we believe that it is likely that engaging in territorial disputes is, in itself, partly responsible for the development of buffer state status. Territorial disputes can undermine and destabilise the state and its leadership, particularly when such disputes do not end favourably, increasing the possibility and attractiveness of foreign conquest.

Because of the salience of territorial disputes,<sup>7</sup> and their connection to irredentist movements,<sup>8</sup> we believe that territorial disputes are symptoms of when states will be at risk of system exit. Engaging in disputes that jeopardise a state's territorial boundaries is a path towards state ruin. The resulting process will demonstrate that a reliable predictor of state death, historically, has been when a state engages in a territorial dispute or when territorial issues develop with neighbouring states. Buffer state status may still be an important predictor of when states die, but there are other factors that have been left unexplored; we hope to uncover one of them here.

This research represents an expansion of the territorial explanation of war.<sup>9</sup> It demonstrates that the territorial theory of conflict has research fertility, in that new questions and understandings can emerge from its central logic.<sup>10</sup> Territorial disputes have consistently been the most likely cause of war,<sup>11</sup> and they also appear to be strongly associated with the occurrence of state death. Territory as a process, and key issue of dispute, can explain more than is traditionally assumed in international politics. The relevance and importance of territorial questions has long been neglected in the field and this article is an example of how the process of state death may inherently have territorial elements. States do not die because they fail economically, fail to provide social safety nets, or experience environmental destabilisation.<sup>12</sup> States risk death when they fail to control and settle pressing issues at stake in the realm of foreign policy. We will next examine past research on state death and present our theoretical refinement.

### **What do we know about state death?**

The issue of state death has not received much attention by international relations scholars. This is, in part, because of the greater attention scholars

generally give to major powers or, more recently, to the concept of state failure, where domestic control collapses but a state's international juridical sovereignty remains intact. Major power bias rests on the idea that, 'the fates of all states and of all firms in a system are affected much more by the acts and the interactions of the major ones than the minor ones.'<sup>13</sup> The problem raised by this viewpoint is that the states most at risk of state death are rarely major powers and more often minor states (also the majority of states), poorly equipped to fend off stronger opponents. This is significant, since state survival strategies promoted by scholars have been developed primarily from the perspective of major powers with the ability to match resources to foreign policy goals. For example, foreign policy survival strategies developed by realists typically advocate that states balance, bandwagon, buck-pass, and/or ally with other states. Questions over the appropriateness of these policies and whether most states have the resources to implement them are seldom raised thanks, largely, to major power bias. There is the expectation that states which do not undertake these specific strategies risk being selected out of the inter-state system.<sup>14</sup>

While realist-inspired strategies of survival applied to great powers remain controversial, we have empirical evidence that they are often untenable strategies to adopt, particularly for minor states lacking sufficient economic or military standing.<sup>15</sup> This is doubly the case when the state in question is a minor power in conflict with a major power. From the perspective of minor powers engaged in such lopsided conflict a foreign policy of bandwagoning essentially represents capitulation, while buck passing is unlikely when a major power is the buck being passed. The option of forging alliances lacks practicality as well, since minor states typically lack the influence and traits that would make an alliance attractive to other states. Thus our present understanding of the process of state death is underdeveloped and hampered by a Realism that prefers to think from the vantage point of major powers.

Scholars are, generally, more familiar with the concept of buffer states. However, usage of the buffer concept has been limited within international relations scholarship since it is largely tied to specific eras of history and historically significant rivalries between powerful states. The essential attribute of a buffer state is to stand at the centre of a strong pattern of securitisation, which separates rival powers.<sup>16</sup> The resilience of the buffer state concept rests, in large part, upon the historical legacy of two examples, Afghanistan and Poland. The 19th century Great Game between Russia and England over who would control Central Asia established Afghanistan's buffer state credentials and Poland played the role of buffer state between Germany and Russia in the 18th and 20th centuries and lost both times. The lesson taken from these limited examples was that buffer status itself is what causes state death. However, questions remain regarding the efficacy of buffer status and its relationship to state death. Specifically, is it in fact a state's status as a buffer that increases the likelihood of state death or something else? Is it dangerous to be a buffer as Fazal suggests?<sup>17</sup> In light of recent and compelling criticism of geographic explanations of state failure we need to reassess the role played by geography in affecting political outcomes like state

death. States do not fail because of geographic obstacles; states fail because political and economic institutions are extractive, which places limits on growth and heightens social conflict.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to internal structural factors that can bring down a state, we argue here that states are likely to die when they engage in territorial disputes with neighbouring states and fail to settle these disagreements. Studies of the geopolitics of postcolonial South America suggest that buffer states often have territorial disputes with neighbours and that these disputes often facilitate the development of buffer status. According to Kelly five of the seven major 19th century South American wars directly engaged the region's buffer states, involving Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay.<sup>19</sup> Within these cases the issue of contention was disputed territory and the eventual outcome was loss of territory by the buffer state. Such cases support the idea that there are territorial connections to buffer status and suggests that scholars need to investigate the specific and underlying issues of contention that buffer states have with their neighbours, especially territorial disputes. The following analysis will take this first step by comparing the respective ability of buffer state status and territorial disputes to explain outcomes of state death.

### **Territoriality and the process of state death**

Territorial issues, as a potential cause of state death, have not been adequately considered. Instead scholars focus on domestic political instability,<sup>20</sup> or threats posed by geographic position between major powers as the principle causes of state death.<sup>21</sup> However, focusing on internal political instability seems a poor unit of analysis for understanding a process of state death, which involves actors external to the state. On the other hand, emphasising the importance of the geographic position of a state does not tell us how or why that buffer status developed in the first place. By identifying other essential factors associated with state death, such as territorial disputes, we can gain a greater understanding and ability to think of solutions. By limiting the territorial issues on the foreign policy agenda between two states we can substantially minimise conflict associated with state death.<sup>22</sup> Territorial issues are a trap states fall into and herein we suggest that states and the international community must place a high priority on settling territorial disagreements in order to avoid occurrences of state death and the problems that follow.

Conflict over territory has been a persistent theme of state history.<sup>23</sup> Such conflict has been likely whenever the borders between states are made ambiguous by overlapping ethnic or religious enclaves, past histories of territorial control or when foreigners establish borders. Scholars have noted that, while the two world wars were absolutely devastating to Europe, they did succeed in bringing greater correspondence between national populations and states and this has been identified as a reason why contemporary European states are peaceful.<sup>24</sup> Compared to states in Europe, however, many states of the global South have yet to experience an equivalent

reconciliation between state and nation. Indeed, colonial and imperial border legacies have all but ensured that most states still confront the issue of border ambiguity, which provides conditions for territorial disputes and state death. After all, colonial borders arbitrarily and often untenably lumped different societies together, fragmenting previously unified societies into separate territories and states. Adding to the problem of colonial border legacies has been the development of a 'territorial integrity norm' backed by US military preponderance, which makes the settling of border issues, through force or other means, more difficult.<sup>25</sup> This places the question of the impact of territoriality on the probability of state death to the fore of research, since conditions of border ambiguity remain highly prevalent among states. As of yet there has not been systematic research on the factor of territorial disputes as a leading cause of state death.

We follow Fazal and build upon her conceptions of state death and the causes of state death. Fazal's theory is that buffer states represent the states most vulnerable to death because of their placement between two states fighting for power and influence in a region. State death is defined as the formal loss of control over foreign policy making to another state.<sup>26</sup> 'Typically, state death occurs when one state takes over another, or when a state breaks up into multiple, new states.'<sup>27</sup> About 25% of the states in the international system since 1815 have 'died'. In particular, buffer states that fall between two recognised rivals are prone to state death according to Fazal's analysis.

We seek to expand Fazal's analysis and move it in a slightly different direction. Central to the concept of buffer state death is the assumption that one rival may seek to control a buffer state so that the state it is engaged in rivalry with will be denied access to this territory. Such behaviour is premised upon gaining a strategic advantage and enhancing state security over a rival state. So, counterintuitive to conventional wisdom, it is found that rivals separated by other states are likely to conquer buffers and expand their territorial holdings so that the state is now 'right next to a rival'.<sup>28</sup> Buffers are meant to separate deadly enemies but, in fact, they may serve as tempting targets of opportunity. Since rivals typically seek to deny a benefit to an enemy, it might not be surprising that buffer states are frequently taken over by a state engaged in rivalry so that its enemy cannot beat them to a strategic advantage.

This line of logic leads to other questions. First, it is assumed in previous analysis that a 'buffer' does not have issues that connect it to a conquering state.<sup>29</sup> In this scenario it appears that the buffer is primarily a pawn in the game of power politics. Of course, this is not always the case. Buffer states are still internationally recognised sovereign states that have control over their foreign policy; otherwise they would not be states in the first place. They are independent actors in their own right and will have issues at stake with many states, particularly their immediate neighbours. They may in fact be rivals with these states, with one or both of the rivals instituting buffer status and not just acting as a hapless bystander. The assumption that minor powers matter little in global politics is inherent in realist analysis and we must move beyond this simple construct of international relations.

Minor states do matter in international relations,<sup>30</sup> yet the assumption that buffer states that die are minor actors in the system is called into question by looking at the states that fail as experiencing violent state death. On the list are Austria, France, Norway, Greece, Germany, and the USSR (see Appendix C). Clearly these are not insignificant minor states one can safely assume are mere pawns between two rivals in the game of buffer politics.

Even if buffer state status was found to be a critical variable that can account for an increased probability of state death, there is little the buffer state can do about its situation. Buffer status is the product of geographic circumstance, and is an issue that falls outside the purview of state control. The resulting policy advice is simply: do not be a buffer.<sup>31</sup> As researchers we must provide an opportunity to modify the sources of conflict and little can be done to prevent a state from becoming territorially connected to two rivals.

We suspect that a crucial variable that can more fully account for state death is territorial claims and disputes rather than buffer state status. What is more, the identification of territorial disputes as an important cause of state death can potentially lead to viable policy proposals to limit the occurrence of state death. While explanation is important, scholars are also interested in the construction of policy proposals to end, or at least limit, state death. States are at greater risk of death when their territory is either questioned (disputed) or conquered by another state. By losing control of territorial boundaries, or the homeland, a leader's political authority is fatally undermined. Political leadership is hard pressed to control the foreign policy destiny of the state when its territorial integrity becomes threatened. Therefore, it is suggested that a primary factor that can account for the death of a state is the existence of a territorial issue.<sup>32</sup> Not all states die and not all states have territorial disputes, yet it seems that these factors are linked in international history. If territorial disputes can help identify which states are at risk of death, then the resulting policy advice would be for international institutions and actors to focus on and resolve territorial issues at stake between states before state death occurs.

Territoriality has been a recent and proliferating area of study in international relations. Once one assumes that the primary cause of conflict is the disagreement over issues between states, it is relatively easy to move the primary locus of concern to territoriality as a cause of discord in international affairs.<sup>33</sup> Territoriality is the biological basis for the desire to control land, demarcate borders and conquer new areas.<sup>34</sup> Throughout history territoriality has been a leading cause of conflict, yet it is only recently that this factor has been put to strong empirical tests to investigate the predictive value of territory as a cause of international and internal conflict.<sup>35</sup> This suggests that, if a state can control its territorial disputes and minimise their importance, peace can be achieved. Therefore territorial issues can be said to be the primary or initial factor that causes conflict while the settlement of such issues could lead to long periods of peace.<sup>36</sup>

Rather than buffer status being the leading cause of state death, it is likely that buffer states are also victims of the territorial trap. It is possible that,

when a state becomes a buffer between rivals, this indicates a potential that the state will be conquered as a result of strategic territorial concerns.<sup>37</sup> Yet it still remains that the territorial issue between the buffer and conquering state(s) is the critical factor in its death. Without the territorial motivation for conflict, the state may never have 'died' in the first place.

Territorial issues include specific claims that dispute control of land or the contestation of demarcation lines on a border.<sup>38</sup> Territorial issues include questions of conquest, secession and irredentism as factors that explain why states are in conflict. While a specific typology of different types of territorial disputes is still in progress, it seems clear that, if a state has a territorial dispute (or issue) with another state, this foreign policy factor can contribute to the demise of a state's ability to control its foreign policy. According to Morgenthau, in terms of protecting the national interest, territory is the primary factor that one must defend in order to ensure state survival.<sup>39</sup>

Why then are territorial issues destabilising to the point that they can cause state death? We point to three factors inherent in territorial contests that may be in operation singularly or in combination and may lead to the demise of a state. The first is legitimacy. When a state loses legitimacy to the extent that it cannot defend its territory, its claim to sovereign statehood is unambiguously undermined. The very definition of a state is dependent on its sovereign ability to control territory.<sup>40</sup> When state leaders cannot maintain legitimate control over an area of the state under contest, the whole notion of legitimacy of rule comes into question. When legitimacy is questioned, the entire domestic system of authority can collapse.

Another factor that may push territorial issues to be a cause of state death is conquest. Territorial issues are frequently a source of war.<sup>41</sup> If such wars result in conquest of all or part of a state then that state ceases to exist in its prior formation. Territorial issues lead to war and war can lead to state death if conquest is the final objective.

Rivalry is another factor that can lead to the demise of a state. Rivalries are frequently started or begin concurrently with the onset of territorial issues.<sup>42</sup> Rivalries are contentious long-standing relationships that can drain the attention and resources of participating states.<sup>43</sup> Focusing on a conflictual relationship can only divert attention away from the pressing domestic concerns that state leadership must focus on to maintain political legitimacy. Failure to allocate resources to the correct problem can lead to the weakening and eventual downfall of a state.

When one state conquers or gains control of another state, it is probably because of the issue at stake between these two states and not solely because of its geographical location between two rivals. While geography does matter, it is the specific types of geographic relationship that territorial issues bring about that make them potentially deadly.

H1: Buffer states will be more likely to die than non-buffer states.<sup>44</sup>

H2: States will be more likely to die if they have an ongoing territorial issue or dispute.

Hypothesis I represents the findings of Fazal, which will be re-evaluated here with a new measure for buffer state status. Hypothesis II represents the theoretical refinements made in this work to include the factor of territoriality as a cause of state death. We believe that territorial disputes are, empirically, a better predictor of state death in the international system and we will test this hypothesis by analysing the international system from 1816 to 1992.<sup>45</sup>

### Research design

Our expansion and refinement of the state death research follows Fazal's methodology closely. States, in this analysis, are characterised by their membership in the international system and we rely on Weber's criteria of states as territorially bounded political units with central governments that hold a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Membership in the international system is based upon the Correlates of War (COW) criteria: reception of permanent diplomatic missions at the rank of *chargé d'affaires* or above from any two major powers, a population of 500 000 or more, and/or membership in the League of Nations or the United Nations.<sup>46</sup>

State death remains conceptualised as loss of foreign policy capabilities to another state. There are 50 'state deaths' from 1816 to 1992; of those 50, 35 died of violent state death.<sup>47</sup> The broader category of state death includes instances of bandwagoning or nationalism, where states choose to become part of another state. This analysis will focus on violent state death, since it is death caused by external factors that we wish to explore.<sup>48</sup>

One method of accounting for buffer status is if a state falls between two rivals.<sup>49</sup> We further refine this variable since, as presently coded, some odd choices of buffer states emerge.<sup>50</sup> Specifically, to require only that a state lie between two rivals (not that it border at least one) to be considered a buffer state can, at best, lead to some serious category mistakes and, at worst, limit the analytic utility of the buffer state concept. For example, the previous criteria for buffer state status allowed Czechoslovakia to be considered a buffer between Iraq and the UK (1945–92) and Luxembourg between Turkey and the UK (1944–92). Instead we consider a state to be a buffer only when it lies between a pair of rivals where at least one of the rivals shares one of five contiguity relationships with the buffer state.<sup>51</sup> In tightening the criteria for buffer state status 28 buffer states, out of a total of 127, have been dropped from the analysis.<sup>52</sup>

The temporal scope of the analysis covers the years 1816 to 1992.<sup>53</sup> This research is a monadic analysis that examines whether a state died at any time during the time series under investigation.<sup>54</sup> A territorial dispute is the main independent variable, and is coded from the work of Huth and Allee for the years 1919 to 1992 and augmented by the MID dataset of revisionist territorial disputes for the years 1816 to 1919.<sup>55</sup> A state has a positive observation for the territorial dispute variable if it has an ongoing territorial dispute during

the year in question.<sup>56</sup> When a territorial dispute is settled, that variable is then coded as negative (0).

The dependent variable here is violent state death so as to build on Fazal's analysis. Our model incorporates territorial disputes as an independent variable while maintaining the controls for traditional realist variables, such as alliances and capabilities, as well as for changes in the post-World War II era. Alliances are used as a control because it is assumed that allies can come to the aid of a state 'near death' and therefore should be controlled for since they may prop up weak or faltering states.<sup>57</sup> Allies add to the power of a state and thus should make a state less likely to experience death.<sup>58</sup> Capabilities are measured as a logged proportion of state power for any given year in a manner similar to the one employed by Bremer.<sup>59</sup> The post-1945 era is controlled for on the assumption that state interactions may be different during the era of nuclear weapons, superpower rivalry and US preponderance. As some note, conquest has been virtually non-existent since 1945 so we must control for this in our analysis.<sup>60</sup>

Event history analysis is utilised to test our argument for territorial disputes as a primary determinant of state death. Each state in the system is one observation, multiplied by the number of years it is active in the system. Therefore there are observations for each state for each year of existence during the time series. Here, we can use event history analysis to tell us how much at risk a state is for death during any given year according to the independent and control variables in the model.

### Analysis

Table 1 replicates the results from Fazal.<sup>61</sup> A simple bivariate picture of the data is important for other models presented here. There are 35 violent state exits in the data as currently composed. Close to half the cases are buffer states as coded by Fazal.

Table 2 further replicates Fazal's model to provide a baseline of comparison for our subsequent investigations. Here, we utilize a Cox hazard model to analyse the likelihood that a state will die given the factors at hand. In survival analysis, if an independent variable has an impact on the dependent variable, the hazard rate will increase. When examined next to a baseline value of 1, it is predicted that buffer state status will increase the probability of state death and produce a hazard ratio greater than 1. If the

TABLE 1. State Death and Buffers

	Violent State Exit		Total
	0	1	
No Buffer	8,695 (77.1%)	18 (51.4%)	8,713
Buffer	2,583 (22.9%)	17 (48.6%)	2,600
Total	11,278	35	11,313

hazard is less than 1, the independent variable decreases the probability of violent state death during any given year.

In Table 2 we can see a near perfect replication of Fazal's results. These findings will be the example of comparison for the rest of our survival analysis. The baseline is 1 for a hazard model and this model demonstrates that buffer state status makes those states significantly more likely to experience violent state exit. The effect of the post-1945 variable is strong and in the right direction. After 1945 it is less likely that state death will be observed. The control variables of capabilities and alliances, contrary to realist expectations, have no significant impact on the dependent variable.

Table 3 represents a refinement of the buffer state data. As outlined above, we have recoded the variable to account for what might be suggested is a true condition of buffer status. A state is only a buffer between two rivals if it is contiguous to at least one of the rivals. This allows us to eliminate much of the noise in the buffer data. States that fall in the general area between two enemies coded as buffer states are no longer coded. One would think that to be a buffer, at least one of the rivals must have some level of contiguity with said buffer state.

As Table 3 indicates, the results change substantially when the tougher coding of buffer state status is applied. Now only 31% of the violent state exits are buffer states. Table 1 suggested that about half of the violent state exits occurred in the context of buffer state status. Our refinement of the data suggests that the strength of the buffer state prediction might be less than originally thought.

TABLE 2. Buffer State Status and State Death

Variable	Harzard Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z
Buffer Status	2.444	0.867	2.520	0.012
Post-45	0.063	0.049	-3.620	0.000
LogCap	0.880	0.092	-1.220	0.224
Alliance	0.960	0.354	-0.110	0.913

Subjects = 230  
 Observations = 11313  
 Failures = 35  
 Time at Risk = 11313  
 Log Likelihood = -137.39  
 Prob>chi2 = 0.000

TABLE 3. State Death and Buffer Modified

	Violent State Exit		Total
	0	1	
No Buffer	9,413 (83.5%)	24 (68.6%)	9,437
Buffer	1,865 (16.5%)	11 (31.4%)	1,876
Total	11,278	35	11,313

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Table 4 presents the bivariate statistics for the territorial dispute variable. Close to half (48.6%) of the violent state exits come in the context of a territorial dispute. It remains to be seen if this factor will be statistically significant and hold up in the context of control factors. However, when compared to the revised buffer state variable, it seems that those states with territorial disputes are more likely to die than buffer states.

In Table 5 it can be observed that the more restrictive coding of buffer state status has an important impact on the strength of the findings. When buffers are restricted to being contiguous to at least one rival, the hazard ratio drops but, more importantly, the statistical significance of the variable is eliminated if one follows the conventional threshold of 0.10 denoting statistical significance. This suggests that alone, buffer state status cannot account for the death of states.

Table 6 adds our territorial dispute variable to the analysis of why states may experience violent death. As the Cox model demonstrates, territorial disputes are strong and significant factors that can predict state death. When compared to the baseline ratio of 1, states that have territorial disputes have a hazard ratio of 2.68. This value is significant at 0.014. To interpret this finding, it can be said that the territory variable increases the hazard of state death by 168% percent (2.68 subtracted from the baseline of 1.0).

The post-1945 variable remains significant and in the same direction as in the other models. Alliances and capabilities again perform poorly in identifying when states may die, but have been controlled for in this analysis in case there was a substantive impact.

TABLE 4. State Death and Territorial Disputes

	Violent State Exit		Total
	0	1	
No Terr	6,692 (59.3%)	18 (51.4%)	6,710
TerrDis	4,585 (40.6%)	17 (48.6%)	4,602
Total	11,277	35	11,312

TABLE 5. State Death and Buffer State Status (Recoded)

Variable	Hazard Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z
Buffer Status	1.695	0.646	1.390	0.166
Post-45	0.057	0.043	-3.760	0.000
LogCap	0.879	0.089	-1.280	0.202
Alliance	1.083	0.400	0.220	0.829

Subjects = 230  
 Obs = 11308  
 Failures = 35  
 Time at Risk = 11308  
 Log Likelihood = -137.39  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Table 7 represents our final model. The variables of territorial disputes and buffer state status may have an interactive effect in our model since the variables both become positive and significant if put in a combined model without an interaction term. Therefore we have made an interactive term for buffer state status and territorial disputes. The explanation could be that territorial disputes and buffer state status work hand in hand to explain when states die. A buffer state may be more likely to have a territorial issue and therefore it is more likely to die. To investigate whether the variables work interactively we present the results in Table 7.

In Table 7 the interaction between territorial disputes and buffer state status (recoded) is positive but not statistically significant. The factor of territorial disputes does remain positive and statistically significant, while buffer state status fails to be significant below the conventional level of 0.10. In fact, it seems that the variable of territorial disputes is 40% more likely to be a factor in state death when compared to buffer state status. This last table leads us to question the utility of the buffer status variable and to have renewed confidence that territorial issues have more empirical content than the buffer variable when accounting for state death.

TABLE 6. State Death and Territorial Disputes

Variable	Harzard Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z
TerrDisp	2.681	1.078	2.45	0.014
Post-45	0.437	0.033	-4.14	0.00
LogCap	0.938	0.0928	-0.64	0.520
Alliance	0.986	0.369	-0.04	0.970

Subjects = 230

Observations = 11307

Failures = 35

Time at Risk = 11304

Log Likelihood = -135.35469

Prob>chi2 = 0.000

TABLE 7. State Death and Interaction Effects

Variable	Harzard Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z
Buff*Terr	0.782	0.605	-0.320	0.751
TerrDis	2.547	1.133	2.100	0.036
GD Buffer	2.176	1.090	1.540	0.123
Post-45	0.051	0.039	-3.940	0.000
LogCap	0.905	0.091	-0.980	0.328
Alliance	0.912	0.343	-0.240	0.807

Subjects = 230

Observations = 11307

Failures = 35

Time at Risk = 11307

Log Likelihood = -134.82

Prob>chi2 = 0.000

These results suggest to us that the buffer state variable cannot be recovered as a primary causal factor that explains state death. While buffer state status may explain some individual cases of state death, on balance the factor does not help predict when states will die. The story of state death likely involves the failure to settle outstanding territorial issues rather than geographic position between rival states. To further investigate our theory and explore the causal mechanisms involved, we provide a case study analysis of Poland's interactions as a buffer state that also had territorial issues at stake.

### Late 18th and early 20th century Poland

We next move to a qualitative approach to further explore our theory and results. We only intend to demonstrate that the theory has explanatory power when used to examine specific cases of state death. These case studies are illustrative rather than theory testing or confirming and demonstrate the predominant role of territoriality before the establishment of a state as a buffer.<sup>62</sup>

Here we will revisit what have commonly been held as the classic buffer examples leading to state death, late 18th and early 20th century Poland. Although the case of late 18th century Poland comes before our empirical analysis, Fazal nevertheless employs it as a case illustrating the impact of buffer status leading to state death.<sup>63</sup> As such, we revisit this period of Polish history in order to discover if there were also prominent issues of territoriality involved that have previously been ignored. Having demonstrated empirically that the factor of territorial disputes offers a more compelling explanation of state death than buffer state status for the period 1816–1992 it should be useful to revisit what has become the conventional viewpoint for Poland's demise. Furthermore, in order to establish the coherence of our theory on the link between state death and territorial disputes, illustrative case studies are important.<sup>64</sup> Late 18th century Poland has the added benefit of being outside the time period under investigation statistically, suggesting increased generalisability of our theory throughout history.

Geographically situated between Imperial Russia, Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire the Polish state experienced a slow death via three partitions from 1772 and 1795. While some scholars have laid heavy emphasis on Poland's exit from the state system primarily as the result of its geographically lying between competing rivals, such a conclusion can only be maintained if one limits their treatment of Polish history to the immediate period prior to partition. Poland had not always been the weak state that it eventually became in late 18th century Europe. In order to clarify this argument we will briefly reappraise and expand upon Poland's relationship with two of its neighbours, Russia and Prussia.

During the mid-16th century the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (formed in 1569) was regionally formidable. For example, Poland invaded Russia on several occasions throughout the early 17th century and successfully captured Moscow for a brief period between 1610 and 1612

before eventually being repulsed by the Russian army. Conflict between Poland and Russia flared again in the mid-17th century as disputes over border territories (including Bely, Dorogobuzh and Smolensk) sparked the Russo-Polish War of 1654–67.<sup>65</sup> Although Poland was critically weakened during this war and would subsequently pose little threat to an expanding Russian empire, these militarised events belie conventional viewpoints of a hapless Poland perennially in the way of great power rivalry. Indeed, this snapshot of Polish–Russian relations suggests that Poland’s road to state death was paved in no small part from its earlier rivalry and conflict over disputed border territory with Russia.

In applying similar scrutiny to Polish–Prussian relations we are further disabused from seeing Poland as purely a powerless victim of greater regional rivalries. Just as Poland competed over disputed territory with Russia, so too did Poland and Prussia engage in territorial disputes over the port city of Gdansk (Danzig). Indeed, from 1308 to 1521 Poland and Prussia (the Teutonic Order before 1454) engaged in no fewer than nine wars over the disputed city of Gdansk.<sup>66</sup> Before the 1793 annexation of Gdansk by Prussia under Fredrick the Great the port city had been under Polish control for some three centuries. Again we have a historical record that calls into question the accuracy of conceptualising Poland solely as a powerless buffer state caught between other states engaged in rivalry. Instead the historical record supports the position that Poland was a significant player in Eastern Europe before the late 18th century partitions of its territory, and fiercely competed with its immediate neighbours for control of disputed territory.

After having been partitioned out of existence in the late 18th century Poland was resurrected as a republic by the victors of the Great War with the signing of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Conventional viewpoints treat Poland as essentially reprising its earlier role as a buffer state at the mercy of its neighbours, Germany and Russia. However, this viewpoint, and the identification of Poland as merely recapitulating its role as a buffer state, do not bear scrutiny. The eventual repartitioning of Poland between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was not, by itself, the byproduct of an extraneous great power rivalry. Again the historical record suggests a prominent role for territoriality as opposed to buffer status for Poland’s eventual demise.

Carving out a Polish state from what had formerly been, for over a century, German and Russian territory was bound to raise complex boundary issues prone to igniting territorial disputes. Regarding Polish–German relations we once again see the port city of Gdansk and its inclusion as part of a re-established Polish state as particularly contentious. Despite Gdansk’s Polish heritage, the city remained demographically German, which resulted in its establishment as a ‘free city’ granted internal autonomy, while its external relations were controlled by Poland. Initially Poland took a conciliatory stance towards Germany and its claim on the port city and sought a negotiated outcome to the dispute. However, the rise of Nazism in Germany during the 1930s facilitated an increasing bellicosity and assertiveness by the Germans towards reincorporating Gdansk. Mindful of its relative

military weakness *vis à vis* a rearming Germany, Poland halted its policy of compromise and chose a policy of alliance, with the establishment of the Anglo-Polish military alliance signed in the spring of 1939. Polish–German relations subsequently deteriorated, resulting in several border skirmishes between the two states before Germany’s 1 September 1939 invasion. Again we find the buffer explanation of Poland’s death, whereby Poland was merely in the way of an extraneous great power rivalry between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, inadequate. Poland and Germany were engaged in a contentious territorial dispute over the status of the port city Gdansk and German nationals living in Poland, a dispute Germany was willing to go to war over and which led to the death of the re-established Polish state.

Polish–Russian relations would prove to be just as contentious as Polish–German relations had been. In the aftermath of the Great War Poland immediately took an aggressive stance towards a Russia racked by revolution and civil war. Seeking to reclaim territory it had lost during the late 18th century partitions in Western Ukraine and Belorussia, Poland launched an invasion, sparking the Polish–Soviet War of 1919–21.<sup>67</sup> Despite Russia’s weakened condition, the war ended in stalemate, with both sides agreeing to split the disputed territory in Ukraine and Belorussia with the signing of the Peace of Riga in 1921. Clearly Poland’s launching of a war with its Russian neighbour over disputed territory, again, belies conventional views of early 20th century Poland reprising its role as merely a buffer state at the mercy of extraneous great power rivalries. Future conflicts with Russia must be examined in the context of the earlier border war.

While this case study is intended to be illustrative and not theory testing, our work suggests a need to reappraise Poland’s place as the archetypical buffer state. Far from being a powerless minor state at the mercy of competing regional rivals, the history of Poland is littered with instances of serious disputes over territory with its neighbours, disputes that it initially benefited from but which ultimately left it vulnerable as its neighbours became more powerful. For Poland the road to buffer state status was paved by its engagement in repeated territorial disputes with its neighbours, disputes that it sometimes initiated and could not resolve peacefully, leading, ultimately, to its death on multiple occasions.

#### Assessment and future directions

Our research demonstrates that territorial disputes are important factors that can help tell the story of state death. While buffer state status increases the probability a state will die, we have less confidence in this prediction with a refinement of the buffer state data, because the factor fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. If buffer states are restricted to those states that border at least one of the rivals in question, it is unclear if being a buffer actually increases the probability of state death.

States that experience an active territorial dispute are more likely to experience state death. This finding is not terribly surprising if one considers the importance of territorial conflict throughout history. When a state

experiences a territorial dispute, the internal domestic processes change and leaders are imperilled. Territorial disputes lead to rivalry and those states in rivalry can fail if a leader is not able to maintain and mobilise strong domestic support against an encroaching enemy.<sup>68</sup> States that have territorial disputes are also likely to end up in war and thus suffer the consequences of war in the form of conquest or general societal destabilisation, facilitating state death. With this knowledge it is important to consider the importance of settling territorial issues before they lock in and lead to protracted conflict. Our policy advice in general is to constrain and constrict the ability of states to use force, particularly when territorial issues are at stake. If bolstered, international and regionally based institutions can provide mechanisms (international law, mediation, provision of incentives) that will diffuse the territorial conflicts that might lead to state death. In an interdependent world it is in the interest of the vast majority of states to avoid the instability resultant from territorial disputes and state death. What is required is the will to cooperate and act.

We now have a firmer grasp on why states die and encourage others to further expand our knowledge of the causes of state death. There are doubtless many more factors that can help account for the death of a state, including rivalry, civil war and environmental issues. But what of state life—when do states thrive? Future work should build on this research to uncover the causes of state survival. We suspect that neighbourhoods and outside support, not limited to military alliances, are important. If a state lies in a geopolitically relevant region where conflict spill-over can seriously affect the stability of other states, it is likely that states in such a region are at greater risk of experiencing state death. But the impact of neighbourhood effects can be mitigated or ended if there is a relevant security community in operation, as demonstrated by European integration. This process has unfolded in the region of Europe and North America, where some powerful states prop up weaker states to prevent them from experiencing death.

Scholars should continue to work on the issue of state death since the ramifications of such events are widespread for regional networks. Much like the death of a star, the death of a state can suck surrounding states into the gravity well of its singularity. For the international system to remain stable, it is imperative for state death to be monitored and controlled. The results presented here suggest that an important way to prevent state death is to work on removing territorial issues from the foreign policy agendas of states.

## Notes

We thank Matt Powers, Amy Beth Schoenecker, Victor Marin and Gene Mueller for their research assistance and comments. Tanisha Fazal graciously provided her data for replication and extension.

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- 3 R Rotberg, 'Failed states in a world of terror', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2002.

- 4 TM Fazal, 'State death in the international system', *International Organization*, 58, 2004, pp 311–344.
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- 11 J Vasquez & B Valeriano, 'Classification of interstate wars', *Journal of Politics*, 72(2), 2010, pp 292–309.
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- 13 K Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p 61.
- 14 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. See also J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: WW Norton, 2001.
- 15 Fazal, *State Death*.
- 16 B Buzan & O Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- 17 Fazal, 'State death in the international system'. See also Fazal, *State Death*.
- 18 D Acemoglu & JA Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, New York: Crown Business, 2012.
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- 20 Rotberg, 'Failed states in a world of terror'.
- 21 Fazal, *State Death*.
- 22 J Vasquez & B Valeriano, 'Territory as a source of conflict and a road to peace', in J Bercovitch, V Kremenyuk & IW Zartman (ed), *Sage Handbook on Conflict Resolution 2009*, pp 193–209.
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- 26 Fazal, 'State death in the international system', p 312. While we are not completely satisfied with this definition, this research is aimed at the accumulation of knowledge. We first seek to confirm Fazal's results and expand on them. To do this, we must use her definition of state death and seek to explain this in our analysis.
- 27 Fazal, *State Death*, p 1.
- 28 Fazal, 'State death in the international system', p 313.
- 29 Fazal, 'State death in the international system'.
- 30 B Valeriano, 'The tragedy of offensive realism: testing aggressive power politics models', *International Interactions*, 35(2), 2009, pp 179–206.
- 31 Whether or not policy relevance is a useful way to judge the adequacy of theoretical propositions is an open debate in the field. We follow Vasquez and believe that policy relevance is a useful criterion to evaluate a theory but empirical accuracy, research fertility and explanatory power are more important factors. See J Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- 32 In general our theory is multicausal but here we only focus on the newly suggested factors of territoriality and buffer state status.
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- 42 J Vasquez & CS Leski, 'The origins and war-proneness of international rivalries', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4, 2001, pp 295–316. See also M Colaresi, K Rasler & WR Thompson, *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space, and Conflict Escalation*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- 43 PF Diehl & G Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
- 44 Fazal, 'State death in the international system', p 314.
- 45 It should be mentioned that Huth and Allee are really measuring territorial issues between states and not formal disputes that have led to militarised conflict. Here, we use the term 'territorial dispute' to refer to a territorial issue as disagreement between two states to remain consistent with the literature. See Huth & Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*.
- 46 M Small & JD Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982.
- 47 Fazal, 'State death in the international system', p 319.
- 48 Violent state death is also the dependent variable in Fazal's analysis.
- 49 Fazal, 'State death in the international system', p 321.
- 50 For a complete list of Fazal's buffer see appendixes A and B.
- 51 DM Stinnett, J Tir, P Schafer, PF Diehl & C Gochman, 'The Correlates of War Project direct contiguity data, Version 3', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 19(2), 2002, pp 58–66. These contiguity relationships are: separated by a land or river border; separated by 12 miles of water or less; separated by 24 miles of water or less (but more than 12 miles); separated by 150 miles of water or less (but more than 24 miles); separated by 400 miles of water or less (but more than 150 miles).
- 52 Appendix C lists those buffer states dropped from this analysis.
- 53 The Huth and Allee (*Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*) dataset covers territorial claims and issues, while the MID dataset (Goshen et al 2004) only captures explicit government-sanctioned threats, displays or uses of force intended to revise the territorial status quo. The two variables are *not* equal; one measures territorial claims and the other measures revisionist attempts to change the status quo over territorial issues, yet each variable does measure for the presence of a territorial issue or dispute that can alter relations between and within states. Expanding our data back to 1816 only adds one positive case of a territorial state death, so we do not believe our data is biased in favor of the MID observations. If anything, the expansion of our analysis back to 1816 biases the results against our hypothesis and adds more time series to our investigation. F Ghosn, G Palmer & SA Bremer, 'The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 21(2), 2004, pp 133–154.
- 54 While it might be interesting and important to examine whom a state has a territorial dispute with in order to examine the relevance for the case, this is virtually impossible with monadic analysis. We could control for neighbourhoods but think this is unnecessary, since the great majority of territorial disputes are between neighbours. Therefore we simply ask if a state has an ongoing territorial dispute before its exit from the system.
- 55 Huth & Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. The MID territorial disputes are those that have a score of 2 for the 'revtype' variable. Data can be found at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.
- 56 It might be useful to look at territorial exchanges (Tir, Schafer et al 1998) to measure the amount of territory lost during these disputes, but as the dataset is currently composed we can only know that territory was lost and not how much of a state was lost (entire state, half, small part). J Tir, P Schafer,

- PF Diehl & G Goertz, 'Territorial Changes, 1816–1996: procedures and data', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 16(1), p 89.
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- 58 HJ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf, 1948.
- 59 SA Bremer, 'Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36, 1992, pp 178–197.
- 60 A Simmons, 'The death of conquest', *The National Interest*, 3, 2003, pp 41–49; and B Atzili, 'When good fences make bad neighbors: fixed borders, state weakness, and international conflict', *International Security*, 3(31), 2006–07, pp 139–173. Of course, other control variables could have been used. We prefer to follow Ray's advice and constrict our analysis to theoretically interesting variables as they affect it. To add other controls such as democracy would lead to a whole new set of research questions and theories as to the efficacy of democratic states as system members. Rivalry was not used as a control because our cases of buffer states are partially chosen on the basis of ongoing rivalries. See JL Ray, 'Explaining interstate conflict and war: what should be controlled for?', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 20(1), 2003, pp 1–32.
- 61 There is always some debate as to the utility of bivariate statistics. Here we use these numbers to provide a context and also as a simple method of evaluating the direction of further investigations. Obviously the best test is a full statistical analysis and we provide this later, but some prefer the simpler method utilised here.
- 62 AL George & A Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
- 63 Fazal, *State Death*.
- 64 Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics*.
- 65 JFC Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World: From the Defeat the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo*, Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1987.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 N Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish–Soviet War 1919–1920 and 'The Miracle on the Vistula'*, New York: Random House, 2003.
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## Appendix A. List of buffer states and associated rivalries.

<i>Buffer state</i>	<i>Years as buffer</i>	<i>Associated rivalries</i>
Albania	1914–39 1944–56	France–Turkey Italy–Yugoslavia Italy–Turkey
Austria	1919–38 1955–85	UK–USSR UK–Iraq UK–Russia UK–Turkey France–Germany France–Turkey Germany–Italy
Austria-Hungary	1876–1918	UK–Russia UK–Turkey France–Germany France–Turkey France–China Germany–Italy Italy–Turkey Russia–Turkey
Baden	1830–70	France–Germany
Bavaria	1830–71	France–Germany
Belgium	1830–1940 1945–85	UK–Germany UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Turkey UK–Iraq
France–Germany		
Bhutan	1971–87	China–India
Bulgaria	1908–38 1958–92	UK–Turkey UK–Iraq France–Turkey Italy–Turkey Russia–Turkey
Cambodia	1975–89	Thailand–North Vietnam (Vietnam)
China	1895–84	USSR–Japan
Czechoslovakia	1918–39 1945–92	UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Turkey UK–Iraq Germany–Italy
Denmark	1887–1934 1939–40 1945–85	UK–Germany UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Turkey
Djibouti	1977–85	Somalia–Ethiopia
Estonia	1918–23 1939–40	UK–USSR UK–USSR
Finland	1917–23 1939–87	UK–USSR UK–USSR
France	1887–1934	UK–Germany
Germany, East	1954–90	UK–USSR UK–Iraq
Germany, West	1955–90	UK–USSR
UK–Iraq		

*(continued).*

GEOGRAPHIC AND TERRITORIAL PATHWAYS TO STATE DEATH

Appendix A. (Continued).

<i>Buffer state</i>	<i>Years as buffer</i>	<i>Associated rivalries</i>
Germany	1876–1945 1990–92	UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Turkey UK–Iraq France–Turkey France–China
Greece	1880–1938	France–Turkey Italy–Turkey
Hanover	1830–66	France–Germany
Hesse Electoral	1830–66	France–Germany
Hesse Grand Ducal	1830–67	France–Germany
Hungary	1919–92	UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Turkey UK–Iraq France–Turkey
Italy	1830–1945	France–Germany France–Turkey France–China
Jordan	1957–91	Iraq–Israel Israel–Saudi Arabia
Korea	1884–1905	Russia–Japan China–Japan
Korea, North	1948–87	USSR–Japan China–South Korea
Korea, South	1948–84	China–Japan USSR–Japan
Laos	1961–89	China–Japan Thailand–Vietnam (North)
Latvia	1918–23 1939–40	UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Russia (USSR)
Lebanon	1948–86	Syria–Israel
Lithuania	1918–23 1939–40	UK–USSR UK–Turkey
Luxembourg	1920–40 1944–92	UK–USSR UK–Iraq France–Germany UK–Germany UK–Turkey Belgium–Germany
Mecklenburg Schwerin	1843–67	France–Germany
Mongolia	1921–86	USSR–China USSR–Japan
Nepal	1950–1987	China–India
Netherlands	1887–40 1945–85	UK–Germany UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Turkey UK–Iraq Belgium–Germany France–Germany
Norway	1905–23 1939–40 1945–85	UK–Russia (USSR) UK–Germany UK–Germany

(continued).

## Appendix A. (Continued).

<i>Buffer state</i>	<i>Years as buffer</i>	<i>Associated rivalries</i>
Parma	1919–34	France–Germany
Poland	1919–34	UK–USSR
	1945–92	UK–Turkey
Romania	1878–1985	UK–Iraq
		UK–Russia (USSR)
		UK–Turkey
		France–Turkey
		France–China
		Russia–Turkey
Russia	1870–1900	UK–Iraq
Saudi Arabia	1967–91	France–China
Saxony	1830–67	Iraq–Israel
Sweden	1876–1923	France–Germany
	1939–87	UK–Russia (USSR)
Switzerland	1830–1945	USSR–Norway
		UK–Turkey
		France–Germany
		France–Turkey
		France–China
		Germany–Italy
Syria	1957–58	UK–Iraq
	1961–92	Iraq–Israel
Turkey	1958–92	Israel–Saudi Arabia
Württemberg	1830–70	UK–Iraq
Yugoslavia	1878–1938	France–Germany
	1958–92	UK–Turkey
		UK–Iraq
		France–Turkey
		France–China
		Italy–Turkey

*Sources:* Buffer states are derived from Diehl and Goertz's list of enduring rivalries, 1816–1992. PF Diehl & G Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Other sources compiled from the list of members of the interstate system in DM Stinnett, J Tir, P Schafer, PF Diehl, C Gochman, 'The Correlates of War Project direct contiguity data, Version 3', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 19(2), 2002, pp 58–66.

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GEOGRAPHIC AND TERRITORIAL PATHWAYS TO STATE DEATH

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Appendix B. List of buffer states and associated rivalries.

<i>Buffer state</i>	<i>Years as buffer</i>	<i>Associated rivalries</i>
Albania	1914–23	Italy–Ottoman Empire (Turkey)
Austria	1919–38	France–Prussia
	1955–70	Germany–Russia
Austria-Hungary	1833–1918	Russia–UK France–Prussia Germany–Russia Ottoman Empire–Russia
Baden	1850–70	France–Prussia
Bavaria	1833–71	Russia–UK France–Prussia
Belgium	1833–1940	Russia–UK
	1945–55	France–Prussia Germany–UK
Bhutan	1971–92	China–India
Bulgaria	1908–23	Ottoman Empire–Russia Italy–Ottoman Empire
China	1853–1992	Japan–Russia
Czechoslovakia	1918–39	Germany–Russia
	1945–70	Germany–Russia
Denmark	1833–1940	Russia–UK
	1945–70	Germany–UK Germany–Russia
Djibouti	1977–92	Ethiopia–Somalia
Estonia	1918–40	Germany–Russia
Finland	1899–1942	Germany–Russia
France	1899–1942	Germany–UK
	1944–45	Germany–UK
Germany, East	1954–70	West Germany–Russia
Germany (Prussia)	1816–1923	Russia–UK Ottoman Empire–Russia
Greece	1880–1923	Italy–Ottoman Empire
Hanover	1838–66	Russia–UK France–Prussia
Hesse Electoral	1833–66	Russia–UK France–Prussia
Hesse Grand Ducal	1833–67	Russia–UK France–Prussia
Hungary	1919–70	Germany–Russia
Italy/Sardinia	1850–1955	France–Prussia
Korea	1884–1905	Japan–Russia China–Japan
Korea, North	1948–92	Japan–Russia China–Japan
Korea, South	1949–92	Japan–Russia China–Japan
Latvia	1918–40	Germany–Russia
Lebanon	1948–92	Israel–Syria
Lithuania	1918–40	Germany–Russia
Luxembourg	1920–40	Germany–UK
	1944–55	France–Germany

*(continued).*

## Appendix B. (Continued).

<i>Buffer state</i>	<i>Years as buffer</i>	<i>Associated rivalries</i>
Mecklenburg Schwerin	1843–67	Russia–UK France–Prussia
Modena	1843–60	Austria–Hungary–Italy
Mongolia	1921–92	China–Russia
Nepal	1950–92	China–India
Netherlands	1833–40 1945–55	Russia–UK France–Prussia Germany–UK
Norway	1905–07	Russia–UK
Papal States	1843–60	Austria–Hungary–Italy
Parma	1851–60	Austria–Hungary–Italy
Poland	1919–39 1945–70	Germany–Russia Germany–Russia
Romania	1878–1970	Germany–Russia Ottoman Empire–Russia Russia–UK
Saxony	1833–67	Russia–UK France–Prussia
Sweden	1833–1907	Russia–UK
Switzerland	1843–1955	Austria–Hungary–Italy France–Russia
Tuscany	1843–60	Austria–Hungary–Italy
Wurttemberg	1850–70	France–Prussia
Yugoslavia–Serbia	1880–1923	Italy–Ottoman Empire

*Sources:* Buffer states are derived from Bennett's (1996) list of enduring rivalries, 1816–1992. DS Bennett 'Security, Bargaining, and the end of Interstate Rivalry', *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 1996, pp 157–184. Other sources compiled from the list of members of the interstate system in DM Stinnett, J Tir *et al*, 'The Correlates of War Project direct contiguity data, Version 3', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 19(2), 2002, pp 58–66.

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Appendix C. List of buffer states dropped from analysis

<i>Buffer state</i>	<i>Years as buffer</i>	<i>Associated rivalries</i>
Albania	1914–39	France–Turkey
Austria	1919–38	Russia–UK Turkey–UK
Austria-Hungary	1876–1918	Russia–Turkey Russia–UK France–China
Czechoslovakia	1918–39 1945–92	UK–USSR Turkey–UK Iraq–UK
Germany, East	1954–90	Iraq–UK
Hungary	1919–92	Turkey–UK Iraq–UK France–Turkey
Lithuania	1939–40	Turkey–UK
Luxembourg	1920–40 1944–92	Russia–UK Iraq–UK Turkey–UK
Mongolia	1921–86	Iraq–UK
Poland	1945–92	Turkey–UK Iraq–UK
Romania	1878–1985 1878–1985	China–France Iraq–UK
Switzerland	1830–1945	Turkey–UK
Yugoslavia	1958–92	Iraq–UK China–France

*Note:* a buffer state was dropped from the analysis if it failed to have at least one out of five possible contiguity relationships with at least one of the associated rivals.

*Sources:* The five possible contiguity relationships are derived from DM Stinnett, J Tir *et al*, ‘The Correlates of War Project direct contiguity data, Version 3’, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 19(2), 2002, pp 58–66.